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Abstract: The paper focuses on the analysis of the problem of defining the crime of aggression in the international 
law and international relations, focusing primarily on the historical development of the term from its initial 
directed efforts, all the way to its modern outcomes. Observing in a historical manner, the establishment of the 
definition of the crime of aggression, as well as its aligning under criminal offences has encountered several 
obstacles which resulted in a continuous delay of clear defining what exactly would the crime of aggression 
encompass. In order to fully understand the matter, the importance of several international documents is 
undeniable, especially the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. 
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CRIMINALISING AGGRESSION IN  
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The notion of the crime of aggression as it is defined in the modern period wasn‟t 
criminalized until 1945, when aggression was taken into consideration as an international 
crime for the first time, following the events in WWII (Cassese 2008 152). However, 
criminalizing concrete acts, which are encompassed by the term of the crime of aggression, 
finds its base as late as the consequences of WWI, which have a considerable influence on 
introducing the term of the crime of aggression in the international law, and consequential to 
that, also in the national jurisdictions.  
 
The Period after the First World War  
 
Causes and consequences of WWI left a series of questions and attempts to prevent 
similar occurrences in the future. A special influence on the development of the crime of 
aggression can be sought within two documents which emerged based on the experience 
which the countries had in WWI – the Treaty of Versailles 1919, and the 1933 Soviet Union‟s 
Draft Definition of Aggression. 
 
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919  
 
After WWI, a peace treaty between the Allies and Germany with which Germany 
accepts a complete responsibility for the war and with which specific conditions have been 
established for the lawsuit against the German army for the violation of the provisions of the 
law of war has been successfully concluded in Versailles in France (Sayapin 2014, 29). In so 
doing, the Article 227 of the Treaty is a key that contains the provision which states how the 
former German emperor Wilhelm II should be tried as a war criminal, to which Germany 
protested (Sellars 2016, 23).  
The former emperor was characterized as a person responsible for committing “the 
highest violation against international morality and the sanctity of the Treaty” (Paulus 2004, 
7). The importance of the provision is manifested in the indirect citing of the terms „morality‟ 
and „sanctity‟ within the scope of crime against peace alluding on the term of „aggression‟, 
even though it is not explicitly stated, since the term of the crime of aggression was not 
defined nor acknowledged at the time (Sayapin 2014, 30). The Treaty of Versailles, especially 
the aforementioned Article 227 indicates the progress from the term „crime against peace‟ 
towards a terminological transition and approximation to the term of „crime of aggression‟ 
(Paulus 2004, 7). With that, a tendency towards defining related crimes into a distinct, more 
general term which directs towards listing the term under criminal acts in the following period 
is evident. The Treaty of Versailles also establishes the League of Nations, which, as an 
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international organization and the predecessor of the United Nations, has a significant role in 
strengthening the tendencies of defining the term of the crime of aggression, which will be 
approximated in a more concrete manner with the further analysis. 
 
1933 Soviet Union’s Draft Definition of Aggression 
 
A more concrete attempt to set the definition of the crime of aggression has been 
proposed by the Soviet Union on the General Assembly of the League of Nations for Security 
Questions in 1933 (Bartman 2011, 425). Even though, as an independent concept, it does not 
represent an extraordinary nor in particular is a too important contribution to the general 
prohibition of the crime of aggression, its significant contribution to the very process of 
defining aggression undeniable.  
The Draft stated how the aggressor in an international conflict shall be considered that 
state which is the first to take any of the following actions; declares a war against another 
state, invades by its armed forces the territory of another state without declaring war, 
bombards the territory of another state by its land, naval or air forces or knowingly attacks 
the naval or air forces of another state, lands in, or introduces within the frontiers of, another 
state of land, naval or air forces without the permission of the government of such a state, or 
infringes the conditions of such permission particularly as regards the duration of sojourn or 
extension of area and finally, establishes a naval blockade of the coast or ports of another 
state (Lettonie – Russie - Traités et documents de base n.d.).The aforesaid descriptions of acts, 
which embody the aggressor and assume the existence of the crime of aggression, are the 
basic contribution to concretization of the very definition of the crime of aggression. 
The importance of the Draft is depicted in the continuous calling upon it in various 
resolutions, charters and acts (such as, for instance the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 in 1974 and the Rome Statue of the 
International Criminal Court in 1998, which shall be analyzed further in the article) and also is 
the basis of the modern definition of the crime of aggression, which this article analyses 
further on.  
 
The Period after the WWII 
 
The key period for establishing the modern definition of the crime of aggression is 
related to the WWII, as well as its post-war period. From the events that followed not long 
after the end of the WWII, the Nurnberg processes which encompass the German Nazis trials 
(primarily through forming and the activities of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nurnberg) as well as the work of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East within the 
Tokyo process, stand out as the most important according to the international law 
significance, all of which will be analyzed as follows (Sayapin 2014, 40-43). 
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The Activity of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 
 
France, UK, USSR and USA founded the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg in 
the London agreement in 1945 (Andrassy; Bakotić; Lapaš; Seršić and Vukas 2010, 419), with 
the intention of punishing the responsible for the committed crimes (Carpenter 1995, 224). 
The mentioned Agreement contained the Statute of the Tribunal and the criminal provisions 
which were the legal basis in the Nurnberg processes. In the scope of the Nurnberg 
processes, Nazi defendants were burdened by the accusations for committing war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, which in their definition, contained the 
phrase “conducting the war of aggression” (Carpenter 1995, 225). 
The Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg placed the acts of 
aggression under the term “crime against peace” (Lavers 2008, 300), further stating in the 
Article 6 that the term means “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of 
aggression, or war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing” (International Committee of the Red Cross). 
The mentioned definition points to the connection of the previously mentioned 1933 
Soviet Union‟s Draft Definition of Aggression, drawing parallels with its provisions. Even 
though aggression was still not being concretized as a standalone crime, but rather the 
centre of aggression has been evidently categorized within the crime against peace and 
security, the mentioned actions indicate the efforts taken at the beginning of defining the 
modern term of the crime of aggression (Carpenter 1995, 226). 
The importance of the Nurnberg processes is expressed also in the fact that not only 
was the crime of aggression beginning to be defined during the trial, but also the 
understanding developed of the aggression as a state crime, that is, the fact that aggression 
is a “paradigmatic crime of the state” (Carpenter 1995, 225; Crawford 1994, 147). With it, the 
necessity to separate, that is, in this particular case the inability to affiliate the responsibility of 
an individual and the responsibility of the state, became evident. Moreover, this was 
substantiated with the arguments of the lead British prosecutor Hartley Shawcross, concretely 
with the standpoints how a state is not an „abstract entity‟ and that the acts of the state are in 
fact the acts of individuals and politicians who had the intention to exercise aggression 
(Schabas and Murphy 2017, 210). By connecting individual responsibility with the traditional 
understandings of aggression, the Tribunal broke through the then-existing barriers of the 
state‟s sovereignty in order to extend the responsibility for the committed crimes onto the 
individual as well (Carpenter 1995, 225). 
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The Tokyo Process and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
 
The International Tribunal for the Far East began its sessions in 1946 and its activities 
were greatly based upon the work of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg (Sayapin 
2014, 43). With the intention to convict the 28 accused, the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East had confirmed the legal solutions foreseen by the Nurnberg processes in its 
entirety, holding tightly onto relevant opinions of the International Tribunal at Nurnberg, 
establishing another precedent relating to the establishment of the individual responsibility 
for the crime of aggression (Takana; McCormack and Simpson 2011, 150). The International 
tribunal has, with its interpretation, unambiguously confirmed that individuals, and not only 
countries, are responsible for the committed crimes.  
However, what is distinctive to the Tokyo process is that the activities of the 
International Tribunal for the Far East underwent criticism from within, which is evident in the 
dissenting opinion of the Indian judge Radhabinod Pal, who characterized the Tribunal as a 
dangerous manifestation of „victors‟ justice‟ and its legal basis as being incompatible with the 
international law (Sayapin 2014, 44). The reasons for this should be sought out in the fact that 
the principle of the working of the Nurnberg Tribunal was applied to the Tokyo process, 
discarding, however, the fact that the war acts of Japan and Germany are not completely the 
same, taking into consideration primarily the cultural and traditional mentality differences 
(Kaufman 2010, 756). 
 
The Establishment of the United Nations and the UN Charter  
 
Towards the end of the WWII, United Nations were formed as a certain successor in 
title of the League of Nations, which significantly contributed to the regulation of the use of 
force in accordance with the international law (Sayapin 2014, 46). After the establishment of 
the UN, the nature and the practice of the use of force which had to be regulated in 
accordance with the predicted demands established by the UN Charter, was altered (Gordon 
1984, 274-275). 
The Charter of the United Nations idealistically offers an international frame for the 
implementation of peace, however, primarily offering a legal frame of advocating human 
rights and freedoms. This way the Charter imposes itself as a legal basis of post-Nurnberg 
tendencies of criminalizing the crime of aggression (Sayapin 2014, 46). The UN Charter, 
regarding the domain that legally regulates the use of force, states how the signatories of the 
Charter commit themselves to refrain from threatening with force or using force, which is 
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, which will be 
addressed further on in the article by analyzing the core of the definition of the crime of 
aggression and its elements, as well as a detailed review on the importance of the mentioned 
article (United Nations 2018). 
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The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 
 
The General Assembly Resolution 3314, which is a certain interpretation of the Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter and which explicitly and concretely defines the crime of aggression, is 
adopted on the United Nations General Assembly session in 1974 (Sayapin 2014, 104). A part 
of the Resolution which relates to the crime of aggression primarily refers to the 1933 Soviet 
Union‟s Draft Definition of Aggression (Solera 2010, 821). The Draft served as a quality base 
for a more precise defining of aggression as a crime. In Article 1, the Resolution states how 
aggression signifies “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Charter of the United Nations” (Official Documents System of the United Nations, n.d.). In 
Article 3, the Resolution very concretely enumerates the acts of aggression to which it refers:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, 
or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, 
or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or 
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
 
However, it must be taken into consideration that the Resolution doesn‟t state the acts 
of aggression exhaustively, which is inter alia made clear in the Article 4, emphasizing how 
the exhaustive list is not of a definite nature, and in so doing, refers to the importance of the 
Security Council and its role of determining other acts which would compose aggression, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The aforementioned Resolution was a guideline to the Security Council‟s intentions in 
insisting on acts that can be characterized as acts of aggression, and even though it did not 
have a binding force but had structural and substantial flaws (which will be discussed further), 
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it still represents a significant influence on the establishment of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in 1998 and the efforts in defining the crime of aggression 
(Sayapin 2014, 104). 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court   
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on the diplomatic 
conference of the United Nations General Assembly in 1998 and is an international 
agreement with which the International Criminal Court was formed. The Statute establishes 
the functions, jurisdiction and the structure of the International Criminal Court. 
Simultaneously, the Statute encompasses four basic crimes; genocide, crime against 
humanity, war crime and crime of aggression. It was the very crime of aggression that 
presented a polarizing component of the Rome Statute (Weisbord 2008, 170). 
During the activities of the diplomatic conference, the discussion imposed was 
regarding the requirement to add the term of crime of aggression in the text of the Statute, 
to which the majority of the countries present on the Conference agreed, while the USA and 
its closest allies were against (Gurule 2002, 4). The opposing parties emphasized the need to 
differentiate the applicable meaning (of the definition) of the crime of aggression and the 
procedural execution of jurisdiction over it (Sayapin 2014, 56-57). The opposing parties 
accentuated how it is unclear in what way will the committers of the crime of aggression be 
prosecuted if the very definition of the term is not precise and clear in its entirety. To them 
the manner in which the crime of aggression would be punished in relation to its definition 
was disputable.  
Even though three different definitions of the crime of aggression were offered 
(Gurule 2002, 11), the participants of the Conference decided on a compromising solution 
stated in Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute which states how the Court “shall 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance 
with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime” (International Criminal Court 2018), 
meaning the foreseeable alterations and amendments of the Statute and its revision. 
Although the Rome Statute offered an incomplete compromising understating of the 
crime of aggression, its importance is indisputable with the very fact that aggression was 
placed under the category of fundamental international crimes, especially considering how 
the epilogue of their forming was manifested in accepting the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution‟s definition of the crime of aggression from 1974.  
 
 
 
 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 1, 2020 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
 
 
 
 55 
THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM OF  
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND ITS ELEMENTS 
 
Observing more thoroughly the historical overview of events which had a decisive 
influence on concretizing the term of crime of aggression, it is clear how the path towards a 
precise and concrete definition of that term was very exhaustive. In order to approach the 
analysis of the existing definition and key elements that define it, it is necessary to study key 
reasons due to which certain difficulties in defining the crime of aggression existed, their 
significance as well as their legal interpretation, which will be analyzed in more detail further 
on.  
 
The Reasons of Inability to Clearly Define the Term of the Crime of Aggression  
 
Since the beginning of the working of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 
and the International Tribunal for the Far East, criminalization of aggression did not continue, 
while simultaneously, other fundamental crimes were present in various conventions (Cassese 
2008, 154), such as war crimes which are regulated by the Geneva Conventions or genocide 
which is regulated by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide in 1948 (United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.). Historically speaking, the problem 
can be observed from various key moments, which this article analyses further on. 
 
The Circumstances after the WWII  
 
First of all, immediately after the end of WWII, in the period from 1945 till 1947, it had 
been relatively socially easy to punish those responsible for the war, taking into consideration 
that the victors punished the defeated. A necessity arose not only for the usual procedures 
which follow after a war (such as reparation), but also for a strict punishment of individuals 
who willingly participated in war and its planning (Cassese 2008, 154). With that it is evident 
how the consequences of WWII created suitable circumstances for punishing the responsible 
for the crime of aggression as well (in the notion and understanding that it had), alluding on 
to how the definition was sufficient in its then current form. It can be freely concluded how 
there was no need for a more concrete definition because the given circumstances didn‟t 
require it. The reason due to which this attitude changed later through time lies primarily 
within the desire to prevent crimes of aggression such as those seen in WWII. 
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The Problem of Permitting the Use of Military Force  
 
The UN Charter in 1945 had established the future system of allowing and forbidding 
the use of military force. As such, in international relations it was forbidden with the 
annotation that it can be exceptionally used with the approval of the Security Council or in 
self-defense, as stated by the Article 51 of the Charter. The prohibition of military force as 
such was clear. The problem arose within the permission of the use of military force, more 
concretely within the predictable self-defense (Greig 1991, 366-367).  
A question arose when would the use be permitted and under which conditions, 
bearing in mind that the very term of self-defense is very complex. The UN Charter 
somewhat concretizes the definition of self-defense through Article 51, defining it as an 
occurrence when an immediate near threatening danger exists, while on the other hand, the 
illegal self-defense portrays an attack that is undertook with the goal to anticipate the 
potential act of aggression.  
Framing the term of self-defense consists of establishing exceptions from the rules of 
prohibiting the use of military force, because when self-defense if permitted, the prohibition 
of military force is not afflicted, and a state cannot be considered as an aggressor. However, 
at the same time it is necessary to notice how the sole term is insufficiently concretized since 
it is left to free interpretation. As it is an exception, it presents a permitted departure from the 
basic rule, and as such it aggravates the criminalization of aggression. Due to that, the lack of 
preciseness in this concrete case lead to the inability to clearly define the crime of aggression.  
 
The Circumstances and the Period of the Cold War  
 
Specific circumstances, which characterized the period of the Cold War, lead to the 
inability to clearly define the crime of aggression. Namely, neither of the blocks wanted to 
clearly define the term out of fear that it could be used in ideological and political battle 
between two sides (Cassese 2008, 155). The clear definition of the crime of aggression would, 
in that case, become one more asset of the conflict and taking this into consideration, the 
concretization of the term was not only unnecessary but potentially risky as well, therefore 
resulting in this terminological status-quo. On the other hand, it is important to mention how 
during the Cold War, the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1974 occurred nevertheless, 
despite the environment and the circumstances of that time, which leads to a positive shift in 
the attempt to define the crime of aggression and the deflection from the „deadlock‟.  
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Review of the Article 2(4) Of the UN Charter and the Significance of the Term of Force  
 
The significance of the UN Charter was already mentioned earlier within the historical 
frame of building the term of the crime of aggression, however, its importance is also present 
in the modern international law, especially within regulating the use of force in international 
relations. Within the term of force lies the very core of the analysis of the crime of aggression, 
which is manifested in the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which also refers to the problem of 
permitting the use of force as one of the reasons of inability to clearly define the term of 
aggression (Sayapin 2014, 75). 
If it is taken into consideration that the mentioned article of the UN Charter stated 
how all members “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations“ (Sayapin 2014, 29) (United Nations 
2018), the necessity to approach a deeper analysis of the meaning of term force is irrefutable. 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter represents one of the fundamental principles of the United 
Nations, and as such it didn‟t offer a qualification of the term of force, but the term is rather 
indirectly read from the related articles of the Charter (concretely the Articles 41 and 46 that 
mention the terms „armed force‟ and „armed forces‟). Compliant to this, it could be concluded 
how the UN Charter primarily leans on the military aspect and the understanding of force 
which is strictly related to armed conflicts. It is indisputable how armed forces indeed do 
portray force, however, it is necessary to mention how force is not exclusively military, but 
also exists in forms of physical (but not military) and the so-called indirect force (Sayapin 
2014, 81). 
Physical force primarily refers to the force which uses means that are not standard in 
the classical military conflict (Ventura and Gillet 2013, 536). Non-military, physical force lacks 
the military element and the matter which is considered as „conventional weapon‟, even 
though it often has deleterious consequences which can most certainly be compared to 
military armed conflicts. This is evident, especially taking into consideration the example of 
such force, which is manifested in modern terrorist attacks, where means that are not armed 
in the strictest sense are often used. Specifically, the use of vehicles such as airplanes and 
vehicles that could be defined as weaponry, since they are used as such, however, this is not 
their primary purpose (Sayapin 2014, 82). 
On the other hand, indirect force refers to the technical and organizational 
interference of a country in international armed conflicts between other countries or within 
the territory of another country (Ventura and Gillet 2013, 537). The generality of the Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter has neglected the ambiguity of the sole term of force, which is not 
surprising, having in mind the period when the Charter was adopted, nevertheless, this does 
not prevent nor does it narrow the area of expanding and building of the understanding the 
term within the given frames. 
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However, what mustn‟t be forgotten while analyzing the Article 2(4) of the Charter is 
that the Charter refers only to the prohibition of the use of force and withholding from it, 
while it simultaneously does not refer to the exceptions to the prohibition, which then refers 
to the argument of inability to define the crime of aggression, as was previously mentioned. It 
has already been stated how the problem is manifested in the question of permitting the use 
of force, more precisely, the concrete situations when the force can be used. The stronghold 
of these situations can be found in the Article 51 of the Charter which stated how the 
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security“ is not disputable and that the “measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security“.  
This confirms what has already been mentioned while stating the reasons for the 
inability to clearly define the crime of aggression – in general, force is prohibited with the 
exception that the right to a country‟s self-defense is not disputable, while the Security 
Council has a key role where it decides on the justification of the used force for the purpose 
of self-defense. On the other hand, this point to a certain limitation of the term of self-
defense with the goal to prevent excessive and illicit force with the mechanism of placing 
certain supervision embodied in the institution of the Security Council. With this, countries 
have the possibility of using force within the boundaries given by the Security Council, since it 
finally decides what the boundary between the permitted and excessive force is. 
 
The Question of Contradiction to the Legality Principle  
 
Having in mind how the historical development of concretizing the crime of 
aggression, it becomes clear how the fact of contradiction of the crime of aggression to the 
legality principle contributes to the difficulty of establishing the definition (Ziskovich 2016, 
384). In order to clarify the mentioned statement in the context of the crime of aggression, it 
is necessary to clarify the term of legality, that is, legality in general and afterwards to frame it 
within the understanding of the contradiction of the definition. 
The legality principle refers to the legal tradition nullum crimen sine lege, that is, the 
principle on how there is no crime without law, implying how what is punishable is only that 
what is defined by the law. The sole purpose of the principle is depicted in the intention of 
preventing ex post facto law, avoiding the adoption of the law after a certain act is committed 
and with it adversely affecting the perpetrator. Legality is based on several general 
determinants; criminal acts must be a part of a written law, it is necessary to precise the 
criminal behavior and differentiate it from the permitted behavior, punishing mustn‟t be 
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retroactive in a way that the person subject to being responsible for the act that was not 
punishable in the time of its committing and the basis that one must not adhere to the 
analogy in applying criminal rules. The problem of affiliating legality with the crime of 
aggression is found in the fact how, unlike in the national legal systems, in the international 
criminal law the scope of the mentioned principle is unclear, and as such it was not explicitly 
formulated until the Rome Statute (Glennon 2010, 71). The principle is concretely mentioned 
in the Article 22 of the Rome Statute which states how an individual won‟t be criminally 
responsible unless his act was of criminal nature in the moment of its committing and how 
the principles, which define the criminal act, cannot be expanded, but rather interpreted 
restrictively. Taking into consideration the legality principle and the manner in which it had 
been stated in the Stature, as well as the already mentioned fact that the crime of aggression 
is a relatively new term, it is evident how a need to apply the doctrine of strict legality exists 
(of course, along with certain modifications which are present in the international law), which 
means that the definition of aggression itself must be clear and concise, with a clear emphasis 
on what is considered a criminal act and refraining from applying retroactivity (Ziskovich 
2016, 384). The established thesis will further on be more concretely researched by analyzing 
the elements present in the definition of the crime of aggression.  
 
Elements of the Crime of Aggression  
 
Taking into consideration the ways in which the defining the crime of aggression  was 
approached, from adopting the UN Charter all the way to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, it can be concluded how the term of aggression is not uniform 
but rather consists of several key elements. More concretely, those are objective (actus reus) 
and subjective (mens rea) elements (Wang 2007, 307).  
 
Objective Element of the Crime of Aggression  
 
The objective element of the crime of aggression implicates the very exercising of acts 
which can be expressed as forms of aggression. Certain forms of aggression are 
characterized as illegal and/or criminal acts which are in accordance with those mentioned in 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 in 1974, more specifically, in the part which refers 
to the definition of the crime of aggression (Cassese 2008, 158). The definition consists of a 
general part accompanied by an incomplete list of examples of acts of aggression, which 
have a purpose of clarifying the general provision (Sayapin 2014, 105). 
As was already mentioned, the general part of the Definition stated how aggression is 
the use of armed forces of one country against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another country, or is in any other way contradictory to the UN Charter. It is 
indisputable how the abstractness of the general provision is evident, however, it is 
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complemented by further provisions, which serve as examples of clarification, therefore, for 
instance, invasion or the attack of armed forces of one country on the territory of another, 
bombarding with armed forces the territory of another country, blocking the ports and 
shores of another country with armed forces, attack on land, air and marine forces of another 
countries are mentioned. Despite the fact that the provisions which state the examples of the 
crime of aggression are incomplete, a certain common characteristic of all mentioned 
examples is evident; the crime of aggression was never committed by one individual, but 
rather always resulted by collective action. A leader‟s individual responsibility in a political or 
military sense is not undermined, but it implies a thought-out planning and leadership of 
aggression by people who are present in the leader‟s narrow circle all the way to the 
executor of aggression, which only confirms the establishment of the existence of the 
mentioned collectiveness within the crime of aggression (Cassese 2008, 159). 
Apart from referring to the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, the definition given 
by the Rome Statute must also be mentioned, which claims in its definition how the crime of 
aggression consists of two main parts – the actions of the individual and the action of the 
state. Such division leads to the understanding how the state is the party that, in principle, 
has to execute the act of aggression, in order to ascribe to the individual, who is the citizen of 
that country, that he is the one that has also committed the act of aggression (Ziskovich 2016, 
390).  
In order for the acts of aggression to be considered as such, they must fulfill two 
conditions; a use of armed forces must be present and their usage must be directed against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another country (Schachter 
1984, 1621). Only in that context the individual‟s responsibility can be discussed, which is 
depicted by fulfilling cumulative conditions - that he prepared, initiated or executed an act of 
aggression, that he was in a position of power and that this act of aggression presents an 
obvious breach of the UN Charter (Ziskovich 2016, 391). 
The first two conditions are somewhat clear and indisputable even though they are of 
vague nature, which cannot be said for the third condition of „obvious breach of the UN 
Charter‟ that remains unexplained in the Rome Statute which does not find an interpretation 
for it. It is so because the UN Charter does not contain any provision that explains what 
exactly is considered by the breach of the Charter, and the fact that every country interprets 
the Charter and its possible breaching differently, is not without significance. 
 
Subjective Element of the Crime of Aggression 
 
Apart from the fact of the existence of the act of aggression and its execution as the 
objective element, the intention of committing the crime must exist as well (Cassese 2008, 
159). This intention, in fact, represents the subjective element, which proves that the 
perpetrator had the will to participate in planning and/or carrying out the aggression and 
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was aware of the consequences, circumstances and the significance of committing such an 
act. The existence of the subjective element is of the utmost importance, because in that way 
a clear difference between the perpetrators who had the intention of executing the crime of 
aggression by themselves and those who were forced in any way to participate in aggression 
and cause its consequences. The Rome Statute further explains in the Article 30 how the 
individual will be considered responsible and punishable for the crime of aggression by the 
International Criminal Court if the objective elements of the crime of aggression are 
committed with intention and knowledge. The intention is seen when, in relation to the act, 
the individual has the aim to execute the act and there is knowledge and consciousness 
regarding what the consequence will cause. Therefore, it can be concluded how the mens rea 
element of the definition of the crime of aggression refers to the fulfillment of three elements; 
an individual as a potential aggressor has to have the intention of participating in the act, the 
intention to cause its consequences or at least be aware that they will happen in a normal 
sequence of events and have the awareness of the consequences (Ziskovich 2016, 396). 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PUNISHING THE CRIME OF  
AGGRESSION AND ITS FUTURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Keeping in mind the existing efforts in forming the definition of the crime of 
aggression, a question is posed regarding establishing jurisdiction over it and the legal future 
of regulating and criminalizing the crime of aggression in the international law. In order to 
come to certain conclusions or possibly to real anticipations of probable ways in which the 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will be procedurally executed, it is necessary to 
review through the role of the International Criminal Court and the Security Council as well as 
the accomplished progress in the recent assembly of member states of the Rome Statute in 
Kampala, what is accomplished to this moment.  
 
The Role of the International Criminal Court and  
the Security Council in Determining Aggression  
 
Up until this point it has been mentioned several times how the role of the UN 
Security Council is of great importance, especially as a key factor in verifying the justification 
of using the force, and generally through responsibility for maintaining the international 
peace and security, which is, after all, the basic task of the Security Council (Andrassy; Bakotić; 
Lapaš; Seršić and Vukas 2012, 160). This was made possible by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 from 1974, primarily focusing on the scope of activities of the Council and 
counting on its competence in solving the questions of violation of peace. However, it must 
be taken into consideration how the mentioned Resolution with its definition was adopted 
during the Cold War, which disabled a more precise defining of the definition of aggression. 
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With that, the question of vagueness of aggression stagnated until the end of the 
Cold War when the problem of defining aggression became current again, because even 
though the Resolution was influential and its importance undeniable, it lacked the context of 
punishing in the procedural sense (Van Schaack 2011, 511). Observing this, the deficiency of 
the Security Council as an institution which could solve the question of the crime in a 
concrete procedural way was evident, and a necessity to establish an institution which would 
be able to do so arose, finally coming to a conclusion in the form of the International 
Criminal Court. Since the International Criminal Court was formed, the role of the Security 
Council continuously collides with the assumed role of the International Criminal Court, which 
should, as a judicial body, act independently, disregarding the influence of political bodies 
and independent from the countries‟ approval which was, among other things, predicted by 
the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court 2018). The tendency towards compromising 
solutions satisfied both institutions and finally resulted in vague and unresolved definitions of 
the crime of aggression, that is, the inability to precisely determine the definition, and to the 
final postponing of any kind of concretizing the definition with alterations and amendments 
of the Rome Statute and its potential revisions which was, after all, determined by the Article 
5(2).  
 
The Conference in Kampala and the Amendments of the Rome Statute in 2010 
 
The colliding role of the Security Council and the International Criminal Court 
regarding the question of jurisdiction of the crime of aggression was present also during the 
Revision conference in Kampala in 2010 when the amendments of the Rome Statute were 
discussed for the first time (Van Schaack 2011, 512). China, France, USA, United Kingdom and 
Russia along with several key allies advocated the standpoint that limitations should be 
imposed to the definition of the crime of aggression; especially in the opinion that the UN 
Charter demands that the Security Council should have an exclusive jurisdiction over the 
control of punishing the crime of aggression (Ambos 2010, 472). Such a view is 
understandable, taking into consideration which countries stated those demands. Contrary to 
the opinion of the mentioned five countries and their allies, many countries of the Latin 
America, members of the so-called „African Group‟ and a significant number of European 
countries advocated for a broader definition of the crime of aggression along with which the 
judicial regime would be connected, which would be applicable even without the given 
acceptance by the countries, as well as the fact that it would be uninhibited by the UN 
Security Council decisions (Van Schaack 2011, 514).  
The finally adopted amendments were greatly in accordance with the General 
Assembly Resolution from 1974, defining the crimes of aggression as they were stated in the 
Resolution, with a remark that the amendments will take effect one year after they will be 
ratified, and only the crimes of aggression committed one year or more after the thirtieth 
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ratification will fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (International 
Criminal Court, n.d.). It was also decided by the amendments that the prosecutor can open 
the investigation procedure against the citizen of any country, while the prosecutor‟s own 
initiative does not refer to opening an investigation procedure against the country 
(International Criminal Court, n.d.). An important provision also refers to the fact that the 
prosecutor cannot act until the Security Council establishes that the crime of aggression 
occurred, implying the significant role of the Security Council and obeisance to the 
standpoint which supports its influence (International Criminal Court, n.d.). 
In conclusion, what can be said for the modern definition of the crime of aggression is 
that it consolidates everything mentioned so far, beginning with the 1933 Soviet Union‟s Draft 
Definition of Aggression which was a template to the definition within the Resolution 3314 
from 1974, out of which the latter is again an inherent paradigm to the last existing 
concretization of the crime of aggression, while respecting the importance which emerges 
from the UN Charter.  
With these amendments of the Rome Statute, more precisely with the Article 8 bis 
paragraph 1, it is stated how the “‟crime of aggression‟ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” 
(International Criminal Court, n.d.). The conformity with the Resolution from 1974 is further on 
evident through the paragraph 2 of the same article explaining how “‟act of aggression‟ 
means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations”. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, 
or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, 
or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;  
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or 
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fleets of another State; 
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 1, 2020 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
 
 
 
 64 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
 
The Future Implementation of the Amendments in  
the Context of the Activities of the International Criminal Court  
 
The aforementioned provisions of the amendments, which refer to implementing the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Courts, still had a postponing nature, stating the 
obligation of adopting a decision on the real implementation of jurisdiction by a two-thirds 
majority on the eventual assembly of the member states of the Rome Statute after the 1st of 
January 2017. This obligation was fulfilled in December 2017, when the Assembly of the 
member states of the Rome Statute was held, with the assignment to activate the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression deciding on the concrete 
date for applying jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to be the 17th of July 2018 
(International Criminal Court, 2017). 
Taking into consideration how the amendments of the Rome Statue on the 
Conference in Kampala were adopted, it is evident how it was no longer the question of 
defining, but rather of applying the definition; the member states have surprisingly achieved 
a consensus on the term of the crime of aggression; the problem of disagreement could 
possibly be manifested in the provisions concerning the carrying out the jurisdiction that the 
International Criminal Court would have over the crime of aggression due to the colliding 
relationship with the Security Council regarding that matter. 
The existing provisions which refer to the jurisdiction were accepted also partly 
because the member states of the United Nations approached the defining of these 
provisions in a two-tier manner, dividing the question of jurisdiction on Article 15 bis, which 
explains the implementation of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the case of 
member states‟ referral and in the case of proprio motu investigations (that is, the 
investigations by the International Criminal Court‟s own request, more concretely, the 
prosecutor who initiates the investigation based on the information within the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court) and, on the other hand on the Article 15 ter which refers to 
the implementation of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the case of Security 
Council‟s referral (Heinsch 2010, 734).  
The main differences between the two articles is the fact that, in case of Security 
Council‟s referral, there is no need to determine the act of aggression, nor does the 
prosecutor have to wait for the determination. On the contrary, a special procedure is 
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established for the cases of member states‟ referral and proprio motu investigations, in which 
the prosecutor first must ascertain whether there is a determination of the act of aggression 
given by the Security Council, and if not, the prosecutor must wait six months before it can 
continue with the investigation (Ambos 2010, 472). It is evident from the given information 
how the role of the International Criminal Court in implementing jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression is, tentatively speaking, not independent, but rather that there is an influence of 
not only the Security Council, but also the member stated of the Rome Statute. To clarify the 
above mentioned, one has to pay attention the paragraph 4 of the Article 15 bis which 
conditions the implementation of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression with the fact that 
the member state, for which it is established that it performed an act of aggression as is 
defined by the Rome Statute, can previously, thus prior to initiating the procedure, declare 
that it does not accept such jurisdiction, turning in the mentioned declaration to the scribe.  
Further on, what must be taken into consideration is also the situation concerning the 
country that is not a member state of the Rome Statute. In that case, paragraph 5 of the 
Article 15 bis is relevant, which clearly states that the International Criminal Court won‟t 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by the country‟s 
nationals or on its territory by the country that is not a party of the Rome Statue. Even 
though it is a relatively reasonable and logical provision, the legitimacy and jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court is put into question as well as the efficiency of punishing the 
crime of aggression, if the institution itself, responsible for exercising the carrying out the 
criminalization doesn‟t have a complete jurisdiction in that area.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The complexity of the process of precise defining the term of aggression is clearly 
evident when the complexity of events and legal activities through historical time frame are 
being analyzed. Despite the fact that this is a relatively new term, its determination went 
through continuous postponing of concretization, sometimes due to external factors of then 
current events and sometimes due to the pronounced collision of opinions of inability to 
form a consensus over the standpoint what should the crime of aggression encompass and 
what should its definition consist of.  
In the intention of clarifying and clearly determining the crime of aggression, the 
importance of international organizations as well as legal acts adopted by them is evident; 
the significance of every single one of these acts is undeniable, because their adoption 
resulted in a certain continuous upgrading and concatenation of new acts onto previous 
ones, implying a certain agreement and confirmation of good functioning of institutions 
responsible for the acts nonetheless. With this, a path towards gaining a concrete and clear 
term of the crime of aggression is facilitated, regardless of the general difficulties which 
characterized the term and still do today.  
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The last efforts lead to a significant progress in determining the definition, however, it 
is important to comprehend how it most certainly isn‟t the final solution even though it 
represents a great step towards the goal. A significant challenge is still to come, and it 
consists of exercising the given definition into practice, where it will be viewed how exactly 
favorable is the current understanding of the definition of the crime of aggression and how is 
it applicable, not only theoretically, but in concrete cases as well. Such understanding is not at 
all restrictive, on the contrary, a wide scope of possibilities which are shown as solution while 
observing the functioning of the definition as it is defined today, favor and bring optimism for 
the final confrontation with the definition of the crime of aggression.  
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